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Abstract
This article discusses how the analysis of interactions between action and awareness allows us to better understand the mech-
anisms of visual awareness. We argue that action is one of several factors that influence visual awareness and we provide a
number of examples. We also discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie these influences on both the cognitive and the neural
levels. We propose that action affects visual awareness for the following reasons: (1) it serves as additional information in the
process of evidence accumulation; (2) it restricts the number of alternatives in the decisional process; (3) it enables error detection
and performance monitoring; and (4) it triggers attentional mechanisms that modify stimulus perception. We also discuss the
possible neuronal mechanisms of the aforementioned effects, including feedback-dependent prefrontal cortex modulation of the
activity of visual areas, error-based modulation, interhemispheric inhibition of motor cortices, and attentional modulation of
visual cortex activity triggered by motor processing.
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What factors influence awareness
What factors shape visual awareness? This question addresses
the central problem in this research area: the cognitive and
neural mechanisms of awareness. Multiple theories offer dif-
ferent approaches to the problem (Block, 2011; Dehaene,
2008; Lamme, 2010; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011, to list just a
few), so we start by explicitly stating the one assumed in this
paper. Following the hierarchical view (Lau & Rosenthal,
2011), we do not distinguish visual awareness from conscious
access, assuming that the former requires the latter. In this
approach, visual awareness can be measured by different sub-
jective scales that allow assessment of changes in visual
awareness level, such as the Perceptual Awareness Scale or
Confidence Ratings (Norman & Price, 2015; Sandberg et al.,
2010). The cognitive mechanism of visual awareness defined
as such is not clear.
There has been extensive research on the factors that influ-
ence visual awareness at the neural, behavioral, and subjective
levels. One of the contexts in which these factors have been
studied pertains to the problem of the gradualness of visual
awareness, which starts with the question of whether visual
awareness is an all-or-none or gradual phenomenon; that is,
whether there are intermediate states between complete un-
awareness and full awareness of perceptual content. This has
been widely debated on the theoretical level (Bayne, Hohwy,
& Owen, 2016; Jonkisz, Wierzchoń, & Binder, 2017), but the
neural and cognitive mechanisms remain undetermined
(Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Fazekas &
Overgaard, 2018; Kouider et al., 2010). The notion of the
gradualness of visual awareness (i.e., degrees of conscious
content, see Bayne, Howhy, & Owen, 2016) can be under-
stood in at least two ways: First, it can pertain to the dynamics
of the transition from unconscious to conscious processing, or
accumulation of perceptual evidence in time (Anzulewicz
et al., 2015, but also see Dehaene, 2008), as reflected in the
question “is there a clear threshold that a representation needs
to pass to enable conscious access?” Second, it could be relat-
ed to the quality of conscious content, namely how many
levels of stimulus clarity can be distinguished between com-
plete unawareness and full awareness of a stimulus (Ramsoy
& Overgaard, 2004; see the phenomenal dimension of graded
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consciousness – Jonkisz,Wierzchoń, & Binder, 2017). For the
sake of clarity, in this paper we focus on the latter approach.
The evidence available so far demonstrates that, on a subjec-
tive level, awareness is typically graded, as evidenced by the
variability in visual awareness ratings (Anzulewicz et al.
2015;Windey, Gevers, &Cleeremans, 2013). To put it simply,
when subjective awareness measures such as the Perceptual
Awareness Scale (PAS) are applied in visual tasks, participants
tend to use all available scale points, suggesting the gradual-
ness of visual awareness (Overgaard et al., 2006).
Interestingly, the ratings pattern can be more or less graded,
depending on additional factors. It has been proposed that
gradualness is influenced by the level of information process-
ing imposed by a given task (Kouider et al. 2010; Windey,
Gevers, & Cleeremans, 2013) and by the involvement of at-
tentional processing, for example, attentional amplification or
attentional tuning (Fazekas & Overgaard, 2018). The latter
view states that attention influences visual stimulus represen-
tation at different levels and therefore changes the quality of
this representation (its intensity, distinctiveness, and stability)
and thus visual awareness. It has been recently pointed out that
the set of factors that influence gradualness of visual aware-
ness should be better specified and extended (Anzulewicz &
Wierzchoń, 2018). First, even if attentional mechanisms are
the most important factor influencing awareness (Kveraga,
Ghuman, & Bar, 2007; Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange,
Lamme, & Seth, 2015), their influence might differ at
different levels of stimulus processing (Anzulewicz &
Wierzchoń, 2018). Second, other factors may influence
visual awareness, and their role has not yet been investi-
gated. Third, it seems possible that the aforementioned
factors influence not only the gradualness of visual aware-
ness but also other aspects of visual awareness (e.g.,
awareness threshold, awareness level, etc.).
The majority of studies that investigate the factors that in-
fluence visual awareness point to attention as the main factor
(Fuller, Park, & Carrasco, 2009; Zhang & Luck, 2009).
However, some other factors have recently been proposed,
such as expectations (Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012;
Melloni, Schwiedrzik, Muller, Rodriguez, & Singer, 2011;
Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015), previous
experience (Cleeremans & French, 2002), context (Kveraga,
Ghuman, & Bar, 2007), and performance feedback
(Siedlecka, Wereszczyński, Paulewicz, & Wierzchoń, 2019).
This empirical evidence is accompanied by the development
of theoretical models of visual awareness that also discuss
different factors that may influence visual awareness
(Fazekas & Overgaard, 2018; Hohwy, 2013; Park & Tallon-
Baudry, 2014). Interestingly, none of the theories have pro-
posed action as a relevant factor.
Here, we present an analysis of the ways in which action
may affect visual awareness. It has been demonstrated that the
action–perception loop plays a vital role in what is perceived
by an individual (Donnarumma et al., 2017; Hecht et al.,
2001). Nevertheless, the most influential theories of visual
awareness do not consider the role of action. On the contrary,
most of the theories propose that visual awareness is based
solely on perceptual evidence (e.g., Block, 2011; Dehaene,
Sergent & Changeux, 2003; Lamme, 2010, and many more).
In this paper, we bring action into the picture and investigate
how it can influence visual awareness.
Empirical evidence for the influence of action
on visual awareness
It has been demonstrated that action and perception are closely
coupled (Donnarumma et al., 2017; Hecht et al., 2001).
Interestingly, however, little is known about how motor-
related information influences visual awareness.
Over recent years, there has been a growing amount of
empirical evidence showing the relation between action and
visual awareness. This issue has usually been studied with a
perceptual discrimination task (e.g., orientation discrimina-
tion, shape discrimination, etc.), in addition to which partici-
pants were asked to rate their stimulus awareness using a
subjective scale (e.g., Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) –
Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004, or confidence ratings (CR) –
Cheesman & Merikle, 1986). It has been shown that discrim-
ination response affects the level of visual awareness. For
instance, Fleming and colleagues (Fleming, Maniscalco, Ko,
Amendi, Ro, & Lau, 2015) applied unilateral single-pulse
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the dorsal
premotor cortex associated with either a chosen or an
unchosen response, either before or immediately after partic-
ipants provided a discrimination response. The results showed
that confidence decreased when TMS to the premotor cortex
was incongruent with participants’ correct response, suggest-
ing that motor-related information contributes to visual aware-
ness (as measured with CR). In another study, participants,
prior to providing a PAS rating, responded to a cue presented
on the screen (Siedlecka, Hobot, Skóra, Paulewicz,
Timmermans, &Wierzchoń, 2018). The cue-elicited response
was neutral, congruent, or incongruent with the correct re-
sponse to the stimulus given after PAS rating. Participants
reported a higher level of stimulus awareness in both the con-
gruent and the incongruent conditions compared to the neutral
one. This result suggests that motor response, no matter
whether congruent or incongruent but overlapping with
stimulus-related response, increases the level of visual aware-
ness. Similarly, it has been shown that awareness level was
higher in trials in which preparatory motor activity was pres-
ent, irrespective of whether it was congruent with the correct
response to the stimulus (Gajdos, Fleming, Saez Garcia,
Weindel, &Davranche, 2018).Moreover, carrying out or even
preparing a motor response might provide information about
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its accuracy. In our recent study we observed that perceptual
awareness ratings were sensitive to the outcomes of perfor-
mance monitoring (Siedlecka, Wereszczyński, Paulewicz, &
Wierzchoń, 2019). Participants reported lower visual aware-
ness in a given trial if their previous perceptual discrimination
response had been incorrect. We observed this effect in con-
ditions with and without explicit accuracy feedback, but it was
stronger when feedback was given.
So far, a few non-mutually exclusive explanations of the
effects mentioned above have been suggested, including
decision-making and confidence models (Fleming et al.,
2015), performance monitoring (Boldt & Yeung, 2015;
Gajdos et al., 2018; Siedlecka et al., 2018), second-order
models of metacognition (Fleming & Daw, 2017), and
higher-order theories of consciousness (Siedlecka et al.,
2018). However, none of these explanations seem satisfactory
as they do not advocate for a mechanism explaining how
action may influence visual awareness.
How action may influence visual awareness
How may action and other non-perceptual types of informa-
tion affect visual awareness? On the one hand, it may be
expected that the more evidence that is present, the more
aware of a stimulus we are, thus an increase in awareness is
reported. In other words, motor response (e.g., in the percep-
tual discrimination task) provides additional evidence that
adds to the evidence in the accumulation process, thus
resulting in visual awareness change. Alternatively, action as-
sociated with a given stimulus representation may restrict the
influence of the alternative representation in the evidence ac-
cumulation process (e.g., when a participant responds “left” in
the orientation discrimination task, the evidence for the “right”
stimulus may be overridden). Finally, an erroneous motor re-
sponse may lead to error detection and in consequence change
in reported awareness.
In all the aforementioned cases, visual awareness may vary
in different ways. We may observe not only increased or de-
creased awareness ratings, but also changes in metacognitive
access, measured as the correlation between discrimination
task accuracy and visual awareness ratings. This correlation
might be independent of visibility itself (correlation is high
both when we know we saw something accurately and when
we know we did not see accurately; the latter case pertains to
the accuracy of metacognitive judgments rather than visual
awareness itself).
What are the neural mechanisms of the effects of action on
visual awareness? One possible mechanism is suggested by
results of studies investigating the relation between partial
muscular activations and the level of perceptual confidence.
Gajdos et al. (2018) observed higher perceptual confidence in
trials with motor preparatory activity (no matter whether it
was ipsilateral or contralateral to the provided response) as
measured with electromyographic (EMG) partial muscular
activations. Thus, the results of this study provide conceptual
support for the interpretation that the presence of additional,
motor-related evidence influences visual awareness (note that
the evidence is not direct as it was a correlational study).
The integration of action evidence into visual awareness
ratings may be related to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) modula-
tory processing, which enables additional evidence accumu-
lation. However, this additional evidence does not significant-
ly affect discrimination task performance, which suggests that
it is added as evidence at a later stage of visual processing.
Importantly, it seems probable that participants are not aware
of the EMG pre-activations, thus suggesting that the content
of the additional evidence is not conscious and possibly not
processed in the PFC.
In detection and identification tasks, competitive evidence
may be accumulated for response initiation or selection. In the
former case, evidence for facilitation and for inhibition of
response compete with each other; the latter may involve al-
ternative motor evidence. Regardless of whether the actions
are executed with the same hand or with two hands, facilita-
tion and inhibition mechanisms (interhemispheric and/or con-
tralateral) are involved in this case as well. The information for
response selection may be maintained and then fed to visual
awareness ratings. This requires the engagement of response-
selection mechanisms that are guided by prefrontal and pos-
terior cortical circuits (Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008). While
the parietal cortex is involved in activating possible stimulus-
response associations (Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, &
Gabrieli, 2002), the prefrontal cortex is mainly engaged in
response selection (Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, &
Passingham, 2000).
Importantly, errors in detection and identification tasks are
often followed by error-related negativity (ERN; Scheffers,
Coles, Bernstein, Gehring, & Donchin, 1996; Vidal,
Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000; Meckler,
Carbonnell, Ramdani, Hasbroucq, & Vidal, 2017); this is an
event-related potential (ERP) that is believed to be generated
in the supplementary motor area (SMA) or pre-SMA (Bonini,
Burle, Liégeois-Chauvel, Régis, Chauvel, & Vidal, 2014),
both of which are in turn controlled by the PFC during motor
planning and action execution. The PFC could thus integrate
evidence from the visual system and use action activation as
additional evidence for visual awareness. There are two pos-
sible types of evidence here: positive when action refers to the
expected and congruent response, but negative after an error.
Thus, evidence accumulation includes the error-monitoring
process; error detection (either conscious or unconscious)
could be associated with a change in visual awareness.
We argue that motor evidence needs to be integrated into
the evidence accumulation process in order to influence visual
awareness. Since the PFC not only integrates and coordinates
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information from other associative areas but also controls
movement and action planning (Kim & Lee, 2012;
Narayanan & Laubach, 2006; Vertes, 2006), we assume it
plays a major role in this process. There is evidence
supporting reciprocal connections between the PFC andmotor
cortices (Bedwell et al., 2014). The PFC interacts with
premotor and supplementary motor areas, and in consequence
also with the primary motor cortex, which co-represents ele-
mentary movements, including their direction (Georgopoulos
et al., 1982). We propose that the PFC integrates additional
evidence for visual awareness because its activity can be mod-
ulated following errors (Narayanan & Laubach, 2008), prob-
ably due to modulation of the anterior cingulate cortex activity
(Fuster, 2001). At the same time, the PFC may modulate mo-
tor cortex excitability: for example, different types of errors
may influence motor cortex excitability differently, depending
on whether the error is due to successful realization of an
erroneous motor plan (possibly via direct feedback from mo-
tor areas) or to unsuccessful realization of an accurate motor
plan (possibly via interoception or observation of one’s own
behavior).
A change in reported visual awareness related to perfor-
mance monitoring may occur due to the acquisition of addi-
tional information, independent of its informational value.
When a participant is forced to react fast, the involvement of
the PFC is reduced and the additional evidence may not be
sufficiently processed (e.g., new evidence is present, but its
value has not been considered). When participants know their
general accuracy, they may adjust reported visibility (e.g.,
perceived task difficulty could affect visual awareness rating)
or modulate attentional engagement in the task due to motiva-
tional factors. The engagement of the PFC in attentional pro-
cessing – and thus in selective information processing – is
closely related to its role in navigating goal-directed actions.
Information about errors is processed in the PFC, which in
turn may influence the dorsal attentional network and modu-
late the excitability of the visual cortex (Fernandez-Duque,
Baird, & Posner, 2000). Similar modulations of visual cortex
excitability may also occur due to expectations associated
with motor actions and the attentional load related to the task.
Given the connections between PFC and pontine cells, it is
plausible that the PFC sends information to the pons and cer-
ebellum, but the existence of such feedback processing has not
yet been confirmed.
It may be questioned whether all the information that in-
fluences visual awareness necessarily needs to be mediated
via the PFC. Although functional interactions between the
visual andmotor systems are not yet well established and there
are no direct anatomic projections from the primary visual
cortex to the motor and premotor areas, there are complex
indirect cortico–cortical pathways throughta which visual
areas may influence motor and premotor areas for the visual
guidance of movements. These cortico–cortical links are
believed to be mediated via the corpus callosum (Glickstein,
2000). Posterior extrastriate visual areas have reciprocal con-
nections with the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), frontal eye
fields (FEF), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), all
of which are areas that are involved in visual attention and
motor planning. The LIP and the FEF play a predominant role
in processes related to visual-spatial attention and eye-
movement planning and are firmly interconnected (Tong,
2003). Parietal areas are also involved in localization of ob-
jects and allow individuals to act on them even if they cannot
recognise them. Therefore, involvement of the frontal or tem-
poral lobes is not necessary for the execution of visually guid-
ed arm movements (Myers, Sperry, & McCurdy, 1962). This
is possible due to the existence of subcortical routes. Parietal
areas of the dorsal stream project to the cerebellum through
connections to the pontine nuclei (Glickstein et al., 1980),
which constitutes the largest subcortical pathway that links
visual and motor areas. Pontine cells receive inputs from vi-
sual cortical areas, the superior colliculus and the pretectum
(Burne, Azizi, Mihailoff, & Woodward, 1981; Mower,
Gibson, & Glickstein, 1979) and transfer information to the
cerebellar cortex, which in turn projects to the cerebral cortex
(Stein & Glickstein, 1992). The other known subcortical route
leads to the motor cortex via the basal ganglia (Saint-Cyr,
Ungerleider, & Desimone, 1990); however, the possibility of
reciprocal interactions is uncertain, and there is not enough
evidence to postulate that there are direct influences from the
motor cortex to visual areas via subcortical routes.
Nevertheless, if they indeed exist, the role of such a connec-
tion for visual awareness should be considered, but it seems
premature to conclude on its mechanisms.
To sum up, there are numerous ways in which motor be-
havior influences visual awareness. First, action may serve as
additional information that influences visual awareness.
Second, action execution may restrict the number of alterna-
tives in the decisional process. Third, action execution may
enable performance monitoring (e.g., thanks to the detection
of errors or because of increased task difficulty). Fourth, ac-
tion may trigger attentional mechanisms that modify stimulus
perception. The first mechanism would be based on the pre-
activation of the motor cortex or co-activation of motor and
visual cortices, where motor-related information (possibly
based on functional synchronisation) is integrated – possibly
thanks to involvement of the PFC – in visual awareness to-
gether with visual information. The second mechanism per-
tains to the decisional process of response selection, where
action restricts the alternative options available. Here, we as-
sume that response choice inhibits its alternative by interhemi-
spheric inhibition between bilateral M1s, the dPM, and the
contralateral M1 (Mochizuki, Huang, & Rothwell, 2004).
The third mechanism seems to be related to error-detection
and monitoring on the neuronal level that involves ACC pro-
cessing. It is conceivable that all the mechanisms may be
Atten Percept Psychophys (2019) 81:2171–21762174
engaged either together with or without engagement of the
PFC. Moreover, one may or may not be aware of additional
evidence.Motor cortex excitability and therefore motor move-
ments may be modulated without awareness of additional ev-
idence and/or information from the PFC that is passed through
cortico-cortical or subcortical routes. The fourth mechanism
requires the engagement of the PFC and top-down attentional
modulation of visual cortex excitability. Here, the action in-
fluence would be indirect: action would influence attention
and this in turn would affect visual awareness.
The current paper presents the hypothetical cognitive and
neuronal mechanisms of how action influences visual aware-
ness. The detailed prediction of the proposed mechanisms still
requires investigation; however, empirical evidence clearly
suggests that action influences visual awareness, extending
the classical view on the action-perception cycle.
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